Torn into a thousand bits: the zerrissenheit of subjectivity by Joff Bradley

Abstract

In this paper I examine the idea of ‘tearing’ in Deleuze & Guattari (arracher in French) and Heidegger (zerrissenheit in German). I explore how these two conceptions of tearing shed light on the notion of a-signifying semiotics, I use the notion of tearing to rethink the risks involved in what I see as a brutal deterritorialisation of language from an over-dependence on technical machines. I shall also inquire into how changes in orthography have affected the practice of sobriety or purity of style in calligraphy. It is argued that because technology increasingly mediates and engineers the formation of signs this tendency transforms the materiality of language and raises questions about the construction and articulation of abstract machines.

Keywords: zerrissenheit, Deleuze, Guattari, abstract machine, calligraphy, capitalism
Technical machines

It’s 8.10 in the morning in Japan and a jam-packed Soubu line commuter train is arcing its way across the Tokyo metropolitan area. Exhausted passengers are jostling for a small modicum of personal space so they can play with their portable, piloting devices. Many passengers appear to be meditating or sleeping, a few are reading books and magazines, but others are flailing their fingers across smart phones screens and tablet devices to enter text, read manga, or mine information. One salaryman is racing through a manga comic on his smartphone, swiping his fingers very few seconds to change the page. A primary school child is learning the Japanese native alphabets hiragana and katakana with one finger. Stretching out the finger, he twirls it to enter a string of letters on his device that will help him find his way around google earth. The string of letters is immediately transformed into text which then zips through databases of countries, places, names, streets to find the boy’s search information. The boy sees this operation from a detached, third-eye. He hovers above the earth, remote and detached. This is a rather mundane example of learning a language – mother tongue or otherwise – but it has much to do with the zerrissenheit of subjectivity. We shall take zerrissenheit to mean the conveying of a sense of tornness, with zerreissen suggesting a tearing apart as in to tear, rend, dismember, disconnect. In Hegel and Heidegger we find this sense of ‘dismemberment’ and ‘disjointedness’ (zusammenhanglosigkeit). Zerrissenheit is also consistent with a sense of chaos, disorder, cataclysm, impulse and chance. In a different setting, zerrissenheit is a term used by William James (1987, p. 955), who roughly translates it as torn-to-pieces- hood, a state of being broken or in disarray. We might also say that the sense of tornness implies a wrenching and wresting asunder, a splitting and lacerating, a rupturing and militating – a terrible curettage.

In answering the question, ‘How do you make yourself a body without organs?’ in A Thousand Plateaus (1987), Deleuze & Guattari consider the ways in which it is possible to free potential from processes of subjectification and signification. They consider how the self can be unhooked from points of subjectification that affirm and are attached to a dominant reality (1987, p. 160). Dismantling the organism means opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage. The methodology is radical, twin-pronged, and crucially, brutal, as it demands the ‘tearing’ of conscious away from the subject in order to make it ‘a means of exploration’. The tearing of the unconscious away from significance and interpretation is performed to make it ‘a veritable production’. The process is comparable to the tearing of the body away from the organism. The socius is increasingly a site of dismembered body parts (Lingis, 1992).

Deleuze in Difference and Repetition (1994) considers learning to be a singularity that repeats itself (1994, p. 165). Moreover, learning is founded in and through difference and repetition - something that is described as a voluptuous apprenticeship of the senses. For Deleuze, learning a foreign language means ‘composing the singular points of one’s own body or one’s own language with those of another shape or element’ (1994, p. 400). While this ‘tears us apart’ it also propels us into a hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems. Such problems demand ‘the very transformation of our body and our language?’ (1994, p. 192).

Following in the footsteps of Marshall McLuhan, who also prophesised the return of orality, Guattari (1995, p. 90) in his later writings conjectured that the era of the digital keyboard would soon be over. Humans would speech to their machines rather
than type in instructions. As a critic of the social abandon of postmodernism, and a witness to the sweeping technico-scientific mutations underway in the early 1990s, Guattari envisages the emergence of new social, political, aesthetic and analytical practices aiding the production of transversal plural and polyphonic subjectivities, which he views as *liberated from the shackles of empty speech and the ensuing erosion of meaning*. Opposed to the mass media’s ‘infantalising’ subjectivity (Guattari, 1996, p. 272), and to what he termed the will to ‘neuroleptise subjectivity’ (Guattari 1996, p. 215), he describes how the textuality of machinic ontology decentres the idea of the subject and moves emphasis over to the question of subjectivity and its production. This focus has clear pedagogical import as processes of subjectification permeate, work upon and transgress the ‘subject’ – for better or worse. Aspects of life traverse the ‘subject’ and are constitutive of memories, desire and the mind. As such this transversal relay and operation is relational, network specific and affective in nature.

Guattari argues that it is impossible to consider such machinic evolution in any simple binary fashion – that is to say straightforwardly either positively or negatively – because one must, first of all, situate their articulation within *collective assemblages of enunciation* (*les agencements collectives d’énonciation*). Communication and information devices produce subjectivities on both signifying and affective registers, prepare new means of expression, and engender ‘new universes of reference’. Influenced by what Pierre Lévy describes as ‘dynamic ideography’, Guattari foresaw the emergence of a post-media era, in which informatic subjectivity is capable of breaking writing away from old script forms to inaugurate hypertextualities, new cognitive and sensory writings. For Guattari, ‘unprecedented’ plastic universes offer the possibility of new modes of living as well as more dead-ends - more death-in-life, more of the same from the *steamroller of capitalistic subjectivity* (1995, p. 91).

Lévy in his book *Cyberculture* (2001) concurs and claims it is impossible to know if technology is ultimately a panacea or a means to mass destruction. He argues: “Always ambivalent, technologies project our emotions, intentions, and projects in to the material world. The instruments we have built provide us with power, but since we are collectively responsible, the decision on how to use them is in our hands” (2001, p. xv).

On the matter of the machinic phylum and the new machines to come, Guattari argues that the universe of references pertaining to the word-processing machine *completely* change humanity’s relationship to expression - whether that is in writing, the alphabet, printing, computing, image banks, telecommunications etc. As machines inform universes of reference, Guattari claims that children learning languages from a word-processor are thereby situated in incipient universes of reference, which are distinct cognitively and affectively, from previous formats. It follows that young children attuned to use new media and technological devices are learning in singular new universe of references. Enthused by this idea, Guattari in a short piece entitled ‘On Machines’ (Guattari, 1995) suggests that the autopoietic and ‘hypertextual’ position of the machine possesses a pragmatic potential to challenge ‘the ontological iron curtain’ (another expression of Lévy's) separating the subject and things. The notion of the machinic phylum is made clearer here by understanding the futural way in which different generations of machines open up the lines of machinic alterity and virtualities of other machines to come. As a general trend, computers or technologies aid learning through connections, for example, a schizophrenic unable to speak can connect with
machines such as the car in learning to drive. Here the schizophrenic forges a subjective composition according to the hold of consistency of different ensembles. Each new technical machine carries latent possibilities to transform existential territories and engender new universes of reference.

Writing in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Guattari goes so far as to claim that mankind, sited at an ‘unavoidable crossroads’ (Guattari, 1995), must confront this fascination with technology to extract the positive momentum from it or risk entering into cycles of deadly repetition, of a more-deathly variety, the being of the machine in inertia, a machine in nothingness. While baulking at a romantic return to some form of primate territoriality, he claims it is important think the mechatosphere through the prism of metamodellisation as this model does not signify as such; but rather ‘diagrams’. Such a move aids the understanding of agencements in ontological heterogeneous universes, in which allopoetic and autopoetic machines ‘live together’. Comprised of ontogenetic and phylogenetic elements, technological machines are caught in a ‘phylum’ preceded by some machines and succeeded by others. New universes of reference can help reorganise existential corporeality and promote creative possibilities but they are equally at risk of being appropriated by the peddlers of the ‘deadening influence’ (Guattari, 1995) of the mass media. For Guattari, the question is how to escape the repetitive impasses so as to resingularise singularity. But the question arises: how does one extricate oneself from the perceptual fascination with luminous almost hypnotic animations on our TV screens or Ipads? While the answer is partly found in understanding the refrain that fixes the subject in front of the screen in a deadly fashion, Guattari argues that computers, expert systems and artificial intelligence also contribute to, assist and relieve thought of redundant or inert schemas. While, Guattari in his book The three ecologies (1996) welcomes the technological development of mass media, especially their miniaturization, the lowering of their costs, and the possibility of using them for non-capitalistic ends (p. 65), he nonetheless warns of the 'age of planetary computerization' (p. 103) which is bearing witness to an era of 'a monstrous reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, an oppressive mass-media culture and an infantalising politics of consensus' (p. 103).

Forms of thought assisted by computer are ripe with mutant possibilities, relating to other musics, other universes of reference such as rap music. So the question we need to ask is why do events seem to turn out badly when we wire ourselves up to machines. Why does it appear so easy to sustain one’s machinic funk over several months, to become hikikomori or引きこもり (a recent phenomena of social reclusion in Japan) with such simple ease?

**Heidegger and the typewriter**

Now compare these remarks with the work of Heidegger (1992) in the Parmenides lectures of 1942-43. In these discussions on ancient philosophy, Heidegger says it is in the use of the typewriter that all men come to resemble each other through the irruption of the typewriter into the realm of the word and of handwriting. Somewhat oddly perhaps, Heidegger’s disquisition on the nature of concealment and forgetting asks the question of the nature of the hand and the identity of Dasein because he perceives the hand as entrusting to the word the relation of Being to man. Concealment, for
Heidegger, hides the entire essence of man and tears man from the unconcealed. The oblivion of being as such tears things and man away from unconcealedness (1992, p.88).

Thinking through the meaning of the everyday object of the typewriter, he finds an ‘irruption of the mechanism in the realm of the word’ (1992, p. 85). Heidegger thinks that cybernetics and technology tears objects from their essential relation to the earth and reveals them as a resource to be exploited. He will say that the typewriter degrades the word to a means of communication (1992, p. 81). As we know, Heidegger finds in the sway of machines and technologies an underlying historic process, a principle of historical movement, in which technology reduces things to presence. Things are experienced as presence-at-hand, a resource of usefulness or not. More cryptically perhaps, the typewriter veils the essence of writing and script. The typewriter withdraws from man the essential rank of the hand.

But if man is torn away from the fabric of soil, from an essential relation to the hand, then what becomes of man? If the earth – no longer the place on which man lives - is an infernal machine, how does one make sense of the ‘tearing’ away of the hand from the essential relation to the human? Heidegger links the invention of the printing press with the inception of the modern period and perceives that as word-signs become type, the writing stroke disappears (1992, p. 80). Modernity bears witness to the triumph of the machine or mechanism qua typewriter - a signless cloud – which veils the essence of writing and script through a signless relation to writing (1992, p.86). Derrida in his essay ‘Geschlecht II: Heidegger’s Hand’ (see Sallis, 1987) finds in Heidegger’s work What Is Called Thinking? (1968) a notion that the question of the human is a matter of the monstrosity of the hand. The hand, differentiated from prehensile organs such as paws or claws is an organ of signing, of pointing. The hand designs and signs, because man is a sign (1968, p.16). At root, man is a signing, signifying, animal and therefore to speak of the hand one must consider the notion of technics. Etymologically, the indication and indexing of the hand is ‘monstrous’ (Sallis, 1987, p.166). The work of the hand is rooted in thinking, with the Latin monstrum suggesting something of the ‘monster’ in the demonstrative. Derrida claims that for Heidegger, hands think. In handwerk or ‘handiwork’, Heidegger finds a process of creative engagement with the world. Craftsmanship like penmanship is an expression of thinking - a thinking with hands, and for Heidegger, the hand thinks before it is thought. It is a thinking. But to understand the hand one must speak of technics and as we know with Heidegger, the hand is imperilled by empty busywork, drawn from the manifestation of a maleficient modern technics - it is in danger. It is Heidegger maintains that the unique physiology of the hand distinguishes man from other geschlecht especially the ape for there is ‘an abyss’ between a beast’s hand and a human hand. Heidegger clearly demarcates the world of man from the world of the animal on this point: “Apes, too, have organs that can grasp, but they do not have hands” (1968, p. 16). In the hand, we find the word manifest in handwriting.

The loss of handwriting therefore is a loss of man’s essential relation with the hand. Technology ‘enframes’ the world through an ‘ordering’ of things that conceals humanity from modes of revelation. Through a series of intricate etymological exercises, Heidegger comes to see that the gestell - the enframing of technological systems - is a destining, a banishing of man into the kind of destructive revealing-ordering instrumentalism. Heidegger argues that when ordering holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing. As such technology delimits the possibilities of poetry
because enframing conceals revealing qua *poiesis*, that is to say, that which permits a presence to come forth into appearance. Technology is an ordering of the world which conceals man’s essential relation to himself.

Typographic mechanisation as such destroys the unity and integral identity of the word. For Heidegger, the typewriter dissimulates the word; it ‘tears’ writing from the essential domain of the hand. The machine ‘degrades’ the word or speech as the process of instrumentalisation reduces them to a simple means of transport. They become vehicles of commerce and communication. Like capitalism and the industrial revolution, we find here a tearing away of man from land and organicity. The history of writing is one of the destruction of the originary word as the word no longer passes through the hand as it writes and acts authentically but operates through the mechanised pressure of the hand. The typewriter tears script from the essential realm of the hand. The hand is deterritorialised from the essential realm of the word.

Heidegger presciently notes how the changes to writing aid the processing of information retrieval systems, which as a resource, he says, are designed to meet the planning needs of ‘a cybernetically organised mankind’. And, as we know, for him the ultimate question is whether thinking will serve the business of information processing or respond to the call of Being. For Walter J. Ong in his *Orality and Literacy* (1982), Heidegger is on the right track. Ong demonstrates the way in which new technologies alter thought-processes, the sense of reality even, and prompt a shift in the mentality of its users over time. He argues that different historical epochs convey different ways of symbolising, storing, and transmitting truths. Ong notes two main shifts in knowledge storage: the oral-to-literate and the chirographic-to-print shifts. The first accounts for how culture moved from oral-based society to one based on the written word. The second shift follows how handwritten (chirographic) texts are transformed into widely disseminated, mechanically produced printed books. Broadly expressed, such transformations seem consistent with Heidegger's history of being as Ong suggests the transformation of oral to literal societies has affected the role of poetry. Ong draws the inference that the electronic age is the age of secondary orality because oral cultures flourish more readily when literacy is based less on abstraction and reasoned debate than on stories, images and audio-visual mnemonics.

To put it another way, in societies equipped neither with alphabet nor ideograms, the inscription upon the body is essentially unrelated to the voice. One learns by hand, led by the master’s hand. One emulates. There is a sense of immediate induction through manual dexterity. There is no prior explanation as one learns by doing, by emulating the demonstration. The hands of the child reproduce the movements of hands of elders *in monstrous ways*. Meanwhile as the writing machine emerges with the birth of urban megamachines (Mumford, 1934) and as the tentacles of archaic, barbaric empires spread across the planet, there is a change in the organisation of the organs as the hand operates a grammatological arrangement aligned with the voice to become signs of words spoken. Writing supplants the voice. It is imperialistic. It inscribes itself in territories. And to subject oneself to the law of a written language is to subject oneself to the law and language of empire. Writing is thus a form of grammatology – reproduced indefinitely in tablets, stones, books. Writing becomes an expression of a transcendent, impersonal, remote voice, a detached voice which no longer resonates with the original meaning of words. As Deleuze and Guattari (1983, p.261) say on this point: “The arbitrary nature of the thing designated, the subordination of the signified,
the transcendence of the despotic signifier, and finally, its consecutive decomposition into minimal elements within a field of immanence uncovered by the withdrawal of the despot—all this is evidence that writing belongs to imperial despotic representation.”

For Marx, runaway planetary capitalism accelerates the organic decomposition and dismemberment of the body, of more particularly the organic decomposition of the hand. In his more youthful and affirmative moments, Marx imagined the reconstitution of species-being (gattungswesen) (Marx, 1844, 1964), the recomposition of limbs and organs attached to the full body of the earth. So here we ask what are we to make of Heidegger’s and Marx’s comments and how do they connect them with Guattari and his ideas of a-signifying semiotics.

Separately, in an interview with Carlos Oliveira (1996), Paul Virilio explains that itinerant displacement of mankind has affected the being of man in general. Drawing pessimistic ramifications from the resultant loss of meaning in belonging and residing, which is brought about through the processes of de-localization and the unrooting of the being, Virilio claims the essence of being is under assault by ‘instantaneity’ and the agon of reality and virtuality. In extremis, the body can be decorporalised, torn apart and dissected. He argues that the test of the tearing-up of being is whether we differentiate new opportunities from the dangers.

Mourning the historical decline of handwriting, Heidegger discerns the withdrawal of the hand, as the typewriter producing signless, unsignfying, a-signifying words. It is here that we begin to see the difference with the Guattarian-inflected critique of language and how this may challenge the Heideggerian conception of the relation of Being to man and of man to beings. With Guattari, we discern an affirmation of the a-signifying nature of language. And what does this mean to learn through an initial relationship with computers and other technologies?

In Anti-Oedipus (1983), Deleuze and Guattari reject a return to full plenitude and refuse to mourn the delinking of the body parts. Instead they insist upon a further rampant, nay brutal, deterritorialising of body parts across the socius, a preparatory move to forge ever more diverse couplings of body parts. They cry out, "More perversion! More artifice!" - to a point where the earth becomes so artificial that the movement of deterritorialization creates of necessity and by itself a new earth” (1983, p. 321). But Deleuze describes the consequence of this as a movement of forces that stratifies the subject and tears at consciousness. As such, the freeing of lines of flight demands a meticulous relation with the institutional strata (1983, p. 178). In essence, Deleuze promotes an engagement with the deeper affective investments that force complicit relations with regimes of oppression. So what are the regimes of oppression that the contraptions and devices of modern capitalism produce? What lines of flight are bound for different, more perilous, trajectories?

A-signifying semiotics

So what of the computer and its affect on the relation between hand and word? How does the computer, the cell phone, the Ipad etc. change the relationship to written language? To make this clearer, we should note that Deleuze once said of Guattari that his ideas were drawings and diagrams’ (Deleuze, 2006, p. 238). The diagram is a way of thinking that bypasses language for example in mathematics. Guattari for his part viewed desire as productive in the domain of non-representational a-signifying or
diagrammatic semiotics, with writing considered less to do with signifying and more to do with the surveying and mapping of realms yet to come. Writing is a question of agencement. It is processual, part of a collective process. Guattari was less interested in new technologies per se than in the collective assemblages of enunciation that they become the operators thereof. For Guattari, extra or non-human, a-signifying, intensive regimes - audio, visual, affective - and the prepersonal part of subjectivity were crucial for generating new heterogeniccomings of subjectivity. Collective regimes of enunciation that operate through TV, the internet, mobile phones produce different subjectivities on both a-signifying and affective registers.

Japanese line drawings

In his lengthy dialogues with Claire Parnet, Deleuze finds in the ‘famous’ Japanese line drawings, lines so purified that what remains is nothing but little lines. Comparing the purity of these little lines, Deleuze remarks that he finds in Jack Kerouac’s writing an expression of sobriety, a style in pure form. “Writing carries out the conjunction, the transmutation of fluxes, through which life escapes from the resentment of persons, societies, and reigns. Kerouac’s phrases are as sober as a Japanese drawing, a pure line traced by an unsupported hand, which passes across ages and reigns. It would take a true alcoholic to attain that degree of sobriety” (2002, p. 50). Here I think that Deleuze considers Kerouac’s prose as inhered with sobriety because for Deleuze everything which becomes in some sense is a non-representational ‘pure line’ (Deleuze and Parnet, p. 74). We can also see this stream or flow of consciousness in the writings of Henry Miller. In the Tropic of Cancer (1961), the faceless writer says: "I am a writing machine. The last screw has been added. The thing flows. Between me and the machine there is no estrangement. I am the machine.” In urging sobriety in the proliferation of lines and cautioning against the cult of the machine, Deleuze says writers speak as someone or something else. Pre-individual, radical impersonal singularities speak through them. Writers are mobile singularities. They write in what the poet Ferlinghetti calls the fourth person singular. Perhaps it is with pure lines that we connect with the fourth person singular, the immanence of the indefinite a life. Under consideration then is the question of what the nature of a Japanese line drawing has to do with sobriety of style and whether something is lost in the transfer of writing from hand to mouth or from brush to virtuality or from brush to electronic tablet (Chinese voice systems). And in his last book with Guattari, What is Philosophy? (1994) Deleuze attaches the task of asking the question what is philosophy to the notion of purity. Maturity in this respect attains a sobriety, a moment that only manifests late in life, when one has done doing with work and labour, with philosophy.

Calligraphy

Calligraphy is a question of speed and dexterity; an art of penmanship. It demands an understanding of the material of the brushstroke. It is a question of walking, of walking at a slow pace. Shodo (書道) is the Japanese way of calligraphy: it is on the way to language. It shares an affinity perhaps with the painter Paul Klee’s idea of being led by the materiality of the canvas, the ink, the hand and bodily comportment.
Yet one learns little by mere contemplation. Understanding demands an entering into and a joining in the process of its production. Calligraphy is thus an art of rhythmic movement. Lines and characters convey a power and dynamic of their own. For Yuehping Yen (2004, p. 66) the relationship between the person and handwriting is mutually generative. Yen describes how the traditional procedure for learning Chinese calligraphy, still adopted in Chinese elementary schools, is comprised of three stages. Novices first learn to copy a model work by placing the paper over the model so that it shows through, and then tracing the shadows. Next, paper and model are placed side by side, forcing students to reproduce the necessary movements for themselves, rather than being guided by the shadows of the master (Yen 2004, p. 116–18). Then in the final stage of learning, the apprentice tears him or herself loose from the ‘hands’ of the masters that have already shaped their bodily conformation. In this final ‘de-shaping’, at the culmination of the learning process, ‘all the learned rules are banished into oblivion and the heart becomes the only guide of the hand’ (p. 123).

With Klee we find the idea that art as such does not reproduce the visible but makes visible (Klee, 1959, p. 76). No work is ever finished which would submit a line to a point, but as a pluralistic, a-signifying, distribution of lines and planes. Writing demands a habituation, a posture, a bodily composure and sustained concentration. For Klee the role of the artist is to join with matter-flow to bring the form of the work into being. Deleuze & Guattari describe this procedure as itineration not iteration (1987, p. 372). Purdom (2000, p.206) contends that for Klee artistic intention is clearly linked to abstraction because in 'making-visible' graphic art produces forms ‘without losing the identity of its own material elements - its calligraphic character, and the rhythm, life and order of its genesis’.

So what is the relation of Deleuze and Guattari to Chinese or Japanese calligraphy? Perhaps one might be right in thinking that the reference to 'nothing but little lines' pertains to the Japanese style of ink painting called nanga (Lamarre, 2002, 2011). These are paintings done in black ink, which consist of tiny brush strokes repeated - a style which comes from Chinese through their dissemination in Zen temples. Nanga was a difficult practice and it was said to demand much practice to master it. There is a sort of self-cultivation leading to the non-self. For instance, in them we find a certain kind of pine drawn with the same brush stoke for its needles, while another kind of tree uses a different brush stroke, repeatedly. We find a sense of emptiness and purity, and the extinction of the self implied in the form, which lends itself to Zen and to neo-Confucianism, an idea which the artist Klee talks about in taking a line out for a walk.

Inheriting a mistrust of hylomorphism from Gilbert Simondon, Deleuze is critical of the traditional Aristotelian idea of the imposition of form (morphe or eidos) on inert matter (hyle). With this in mind, how then shall we understand the observation made by the artist Klee that form (morphe) is death? For Klee, form-giving is movement and action (1973, p. 269)? Art is not about reproduction or representation but is that which makes the visible visible (Klee 1961, p. 76). It enjoins with forces that call form into being. Contra the hylomorphic model of creation, Deleuze and Guattari maintain that the essential relation is not between matter and form but between materials and forces (2004: 377). Their ontology grants primacy to processes of formation rather than teleological outcomes and to flows and transformations of materials as against states of matter. For Deleuze & Guattari it is unpredictable flows
and lines, and the tracing of lines of deterritorialisation which offer the promise of the new. Matter is always a matter of movement, flux and variation.

Reflecting upon the nature of ‘automatic’ line drawings, surrealist painter Andre Masson (1896-1987) also finds in the Chinese and Japanese aesthetic of painting the idea that one must evacuate the self, one must tear the line away from the comportment Western self. He exhorts ‘Make a void in yourself, primary’ (1950, p. 147). Calligraphy therefore is not just about imitation and copy but also of becoming other, an evacuation of the self. The painter does not represent, but is a becoming of the reality under representation. In a 1959 essay on Chinese painting, Masson goes further and says that for the calligrapher his art is a way of existing rather than a way of acting in the Western sense (p. 171). Considering his own art and the idea of the line, Masson describes it as a movement that falls in love with itself. This is also another sense of sobriety of which Deleuze speaks.

Masson’s and Klee’s drawings are abstract machines. The abstract machines that we find in the line drawings of Klee and Masson are piloting devices which diagram a real yet to come, a new type of reality. The abstract machine relays between the real and abstract, it is real yet nonconcrete, actual yet noneffectuated – as an in-between it designates matters and functions. Deleuze & Guattari isolate the proper names but identity the abstract machine working behind them: there is a Wagner abstract machine, a Webern abstract machine, a Riemann abstract machine, or an Einstein abstract machine alongside the proper names of Galileo, Bach, or Beethoven (1987, p. 511). Explaining the point further Deleuze & Guattari add: “Not that they refer to people or to effectuating moments; on the contrary, it is the names and dates that refer to the singularities of the machines, and to what they effectuate” (1987, p.511).

In Anti-Oedipus, they suggest that capitalism is essentially uninterested in writing as it is “profoundly illiterate.” Yet, news of the death of writing came a long time ago. For them, writing plays the role of an archaism in capitalism because language becomes concrete within the field of immanence peculiar to capitalism itself. As such, the technical means of expression such as the computer corresponds best to the generalized decoding of flows. There is no hierarchy among the flows of nonsignifying language - phonic, graphic, gestural – because, as Mark Fisher (2006), explains today’s media- and internet -savvy twitter generation have a radically different superficial relation to language for they already operate on a plateau of a-signifying semiotics. They no longer need meaning. Fisher writes: “Teenagers process capital's image-dense data very effectively without any need to read - slogan-recognition is sufficient to navigate the net-tabloid-magazine informational plane.” In the case of electric language, data processing rejects both the voice and writing. As Deleuze & Guattari say the computer is a machine for instantaneous and generalised decoding. The intrusion of technical machines effectively distorts and disrupts the formation of abstract machines, brutally fabricates the virtual. In this manner, Guattari (1984) discusses the modus operandi of painter Fromanger and asks: “What does it mean to paint today? What can such a practice signify after the collapse of the systems of representation which supported individual and collective subjectivities right up to the great sweep of mass-media images and the great deterritorialisation of traditional codings and overcodings our epoch has known? This is the question that Fromanger has decided to paint.”
Immanent and non-teleological abstract machines diagram the becoming-machinic of mankind and chart the tearing of language away from man to serve cybernetics. They are complicit with fabrication of the virtual. Intimately bound to the plane of immanence, the abstract machine takes concrete form as mathematical formula, in architectural designs, in the diagrams of philosophers, in the sketches of writers and thinkers of all kinds. They suggest something other, something futural, something that is a becoming. They can be found in Klee’s notebooks, in Masson’s line drawings, in the calligraphy and paintings and artists. Klee’s notebooks contain sketches and drawings which continue to influence artists, academics and designers (see Cole, 2011). The Klee-machine grants us a vision of a world to come as it operates upon a plane of immanence. But the question is if technical machines intervene in the concrete articulation of abstract machines, then what does this mean for the future, for those yet to come?

**Conclusion**

This paper has examined the relationship of technology and the violence involved in the tearing away of the hand. In using new technological devices, the hand is no longer subordinated to the eye as it was in traditional means of expression. The hand is deterritorialised from the material of the earth to assume an extraterrestrial vantage point. This brutal zerrissenheit of the hand leads to unpredictable outcomes for subjectivity. If the abstract machine is no longer found in notebooks but transferred to electronic devices which take the hand away from writing, then what becomes of the virtual? With the advent of the writing devices, the hand is piloted away from spontaneity and control that we find in calligraphy, away from the balance of empty and full that is found in Taoism (Cheng, 1994).

In peering through the lens of Guattari’s triadic ecology it has been found that the tearing or ripping away of man’s essential relation to being is both productive and positive, though not without its dangers. The violence is a matter of matter and form-giving in processual becoming. The meaning of the tearing away of man’s essential relation to being situates it in relation to collective *agencement*. The essential relation is not one of matter and form but of material and form giving. Writing is therefore at once a question of *agencement*. It is processual, part of a collective assemblage. The stripping away of the elemental relation of the hand to writing opens up new ways to think and create through plastic universes of reference. It has proven heuristic to think the differences and similarities between the Heideggerian and Deleuze/Guattarian notions of ‘tearing part’ as it helped to clarify how tearing affects the comportment of body in writing and how it might engender mutant subjectivities through *machinic processuality and how this might* further challenge a flattened capitalistic subjectivity deaf to the other.
Bibliography


