CONCEPTIONS OF GLOBALISATION, VIRTUAL GEOGRAPHY AND EDUCATION

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> The most insidious dangers of social oppression are not the horrors done to me against my will - though they are bad enough - but the horrors I am made to desire.
> [Todd, G, May. 'The politics of life in the thought of Gilles Deleuze'. *Substance* XX/3, 1991, p 31]

Abstract

The question addressed by this paper is 'what are the consequences of globalisation for the philosophy of education? It is now commonplace to say that globalisation has recently become a major feature in explanations about a new social milieu, which can be characterised by an increasing interdependence and internationalisation of institutions as well as new forms of subjectivity. Successful participation in this neoliberal 'world order' by the philosophy of education requires that it adequately theorise these new forms subjectivity. There is, therefore, considerable importance to be attached to placing discussion of globalisation on an agenda for critical debate especially about how it will impact on the philosophy of education.

Conceptions of globalisation

Axford (1995: ix) suggests that traditional disciplinary parsimony obscures an understanding of globalisation; he consequently appeals to a wide range of discourses; literature, political science, cultural studies, social and cultural anthropology, and management theory, to name a few. Therefore, any reading of the relationship between globalisation and education will similarly require more than discussions about theories of learning and teaching, curriculum theory, or psychologised accounts of educational administration – although, because they are the content of education studies today, it will also include these. In this paper the need for a wider perspective on education are also indicated by Peters and Roberts (1998: 24) who point out "there is an educational focus to the relations between neoliberalism, globalisation, and the new communications technologies". These three elements are integral to the relationship between the global and the local, and between the economic and the cultural.

Many accounts of globalisation suggest that we are in the process of powerful, new, and irreversible, social changes. Globalisation, however, is a contestable idea; its significance and scope are not yet agreed. Yet, contemporary explanations seem to reflect a growing sense that something qualitatively different is occurring today. This paper argues that globalisation refers to the constitution of global systems that are reliant on the increasing interdependence and internationalisation of both formal institutions (e.g., businesses, nation-states, media, the Internet) while at the same time relying on dimensions of localism (including personal identity and ethnic affiliation). Both dimensions have recently become features in explanations about the function of education in this new social milieu.

The defining issue is how to understand society, culture and politics in the global revolution. The scope of the uniformity of political ideas and practices, the geographical extent of social interaction and reflectivity; the degree of interaction of economic activities; the diffusion of technologies (information, communication and transport) which overcome the significance of space; and the extent of dissemination of cultural symbols and significations. It is this diversity of references that makes it impossible to define globalization in any straightforward fashion. So while the term,

"globalization" clearly refers to both the intensity and the extent of international interactions, it does not stipulate the ways in which these interactions occur, or indeed how an interaction acquires significance in some contexts but not in others. There are also multiple potential political readings and responses to the phenomena in relation to education. These seek to work against any "naturalization" of the directions the world is taking within globalization.

Another way to look at possible future scenarios is to consider the direction from which the most powerful globalization pressure is coming. Most of the theorizing is about "globalization from above," in which it is suggested that the agents of capital formation will eventually create a New World order. This implies that the future effect of globalization is homogenisation, the creation of similarity, and a new singular empire with an implied centralization of power. On the other hand, globalization from below the world refers to the transnational social forces that are operating throughout the world and the extent to which a world community actually based on greater diversity and an awareness of it - rather than similarity - is also a possibility. Furthermore, a paradoxical aspect of globalization, especially in relation to the new information communication technologies, is the extent to which individuals are connected and potentially empowered *outside of* any traditional institutional forms - through the appropriately named World Wide Web.

The point here is not simply that the nation-state remains important, that the major 'international organisations' are in fact comprised of nation-states, or that civil society institutions depend for much of their impact in international politics on influencing nation-states, although of course all these are true. The more important point is that theorists of 'global governance' share with more conservative realists, and indeed many social theorists of the state, a mistaken assumption that 'state' means nation-state. Historically, the modern nation-state is only one form of state. Just as it was not always dominant in the past, so it may be losing dominance in the present, and may not be dominant in the future.

Although globalisation is a contestable idea and its significance and scope are not yet agreed, most views of it fall under two representations. The first is that in its current form globalisation represents dominating universal social, cultural, and economic forces —- some might even say the Americanisation of global culture. These factors include changes in trade relations (GATT, or G-8, that promote the reduction of import taxes, tariffs, and regulations; and the formation of free-trade regions such as NAFTA or the E.U.); changes in banking and credit processes (world credit systems such as Visa, ATMs, currency exchange, and capital flow and financial markets that are truly globalised); the presence of international lending agencies (such as the IMF and World Bank); changes in the factors of production that have led to the rise of new post-Fordist industries (the knowledge economy, the service sector, tourism, and culture industries); the presence of global corporations not tied to any national base or boundary; the mobility of labor and the mobility of companies, which have thrown labor unions on the defensive; and new technologies for the communication of data, capital, and advertising.

The second set of views represents the ways in which the post-national restructuring of the world in an era of transnational capitalism has altered how we must think about cultural production. The neoliberal state, particularly in the more developed societies, and in the developing countries striving to emulate them, is characterized by drastic cutbacks in social spending, rampant environmental destruction, regressive revisions of the tax system, loosened constraints on corporate growth, widespread attacks on organized labor, and increased spending on military "infrastructure." Clearly, the growing integration of the economy pushes toward a borderless world and provides considerable evidence for the reduced ability of national governments to control their own economies or to define their own national economic aims. A new dynamic has also been set

up between the movement of capital, images, and technologies, without regard to national borders or the tendency toward fragmentation of the world into increasingly contentious enclaves of difference, ethnicity, and resistance. Under new forms of cultural production, national identities of political allegiance and economic regulation are being undone. At the same time imagined communities are being reshaped at both the global and local levels of everyday existence. Together, these two perspectives have simultaneously made the world more globalised and localised than before; a new social order, which at the same time, has been constructed by an increasing interdependence and internationalisation of institutions as well as new universal forms of subjectivity.

Much of the debate on the effects of globalising forces has portrayed either a slow or a fast diffusion of Western cultural values, consumer patterns and technologies to all parts of the world, depending on the 'power geometry' involved (Massey, 1991). But as Hall writes, even if this is true, to outcome is often an uneasy mix in which national and other I identities are (1) eroded through cultural homogenisation, (2) reinforced in the beat of cultural resistance to globalization or (3) replaced by 'hybrid' cultures, the result of the interpenetration of local and the global (1992: 300). Significantly, these outcomes not mutually exclusive and, where they overlap, the result does not have to be schizoid cultures and confused or pathological identities.

In democracies, there is no coercive plan; power determined to keep dissent at bay.

> There is the financial iceberg of unbridled currency speculation, sky-high profits and shamelessly over-valued stocks. There is the nuclear iceberg, with about thirty countries - each embroiled in its own network of contentions and animosities - expected to be capable of launching a nuclear attack twenty years from now. There is the ecological iceberg, with an ever-growing volume of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, increasing global temperatures, and dozens of atomic installations which must sooner or later explode, causing a catastrophe of global proportions. Last but not least, there is the social iceberg, with three billion men and women expected to be made redundant, devoid of economic function, during the life span of the present generation (Bauman, 1998: 43-44).

In the present-day liberal-democratic state there are no concentration camps or censorship offices, while prisons, swelling as they may be, have no cells reserved for political opponents or heretics. Freedom of thought, expression and association has reached unheard-of proportions. The paradox, however, is that this unprecedented liberty comes at a time when there is little use to which it can be put, and little chance of reforging 'freedom from constraint' into 'liberty to act'.

This separation of power from politics is often referred to by the word 'globalization'. The term globalization occupies the same place in current discourse as that occupied by 'universalisation' in the modern era. This is because globalization refers to what is happening to us rather than, as universalisation did, to what we need, or ought, or intend to do (see Bauman, 1998a). Globalization signals a 'naturalization' of the course that world affairs are taking - that is, they are staying essentially out of bounds and out of control, acquiring a unplanned, unanticipated, spontaneous and contingent character. Just as the user of the World Wide Web can only select from the choices on offer, and can hardly influence the rules by which the Internet operates, or expand the range of choices available under these rules, so the individual nation-states cast in the globalised environment have to play the game by its rules and risk severe retribution, or at best total ineffectiveness of their activities, if the rules are

ignored.

Far from describing a homogenizing world process, the becoming-one of the contentious diversity of the planet, Bauman depicts globalization as radically polarizing, splitting populations into two streams: emergent "exterritorial" power flows and the slower-moving localities increasingly buffeted by - and subjected to - those more powerful flows. "Globalization divides as much as it unites," Bauman claims; "it divides as it unites - the causes of division being identical with those which promote the uniformity of the globe". Globalization separates the minority whose mobility means independence from space from the vast majority whose relation to space, whether mobile or immobile, is not a matter of choice - for whom space becomes an obstacle and an imprisonment.

Such complexity of outcomes can be illustrated with respect to two processes that modify the interpretation of global cultures as one-way flows. The first is the concept of *indigenization*; the second is that of *reciprocity.* Indigenisation refers to the adaptation of ‘alien' practices to local circumstances (Robertson, 1992: 171) such that the specificity or the idiosyncrasies of the local mediate or dispel the homogenizing power of global forces. In practice this suggests that while there may well be a largely one-directional flow of Western capitalist values and products to parts of the periphery, from America to the rest of the world, or from more powerful to less powerful countries, the force of that flow is vitiated and the global ‘meaning' inscribed in the product or value is given a local gloss through complex processes of reception and appropriation.

In its current form, globalisation is a new phenomenon but in another sense, the world has been 'global' for 500 years or more. Holton (1996: 164), for example, points out that “by 1914, Europe held 85 per cent of the land surface of the earth, whether as colonies, protectorates, or dependencies, or by some other mechanism”. And, yet, in an ecological sense, the world has always been global. A good example of this ecological view and which I quote at some length.

> (T)he still largely unwritten history of ecological colonization in Aotearoa would constitute at least four distinct phases: first, the Maori (the indigenous inhabitants of Aotearoa) 'discovery' and settlement of New Zealand over many hundreds, if not thousands, of years; second, the initial European contact made by sealers and whalers in the two hundred years before the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840; third, the organised British settlement, particularly by the New Zealand Company, after 1840; fourth, the relatively short period of the last couple of decades dominated by the neo-liberal paradigm of globalisation (Peters, 2001: 203-204).

Those who view globalisation less favourably see in it Western cultural dominance, an escalation of inequalities between rich and poor nations, ecological problems, and the construction of consumer cultures where consumers are unable to reconstitute their world in the face of such forces. But both the favourable and unfavourable accounts of globalisation suggest that we are in the process of powerful, and irreversible, social changes. The recent emergence of representations of the world as a single place brought about by global homogenisation tends to imply either an a-historical account of the present or one that regards the history of globalisation in social evolutionary terms. This sense of the social is invested with a sense of historical necessity, coherence, and continuity that derive from concerns of the present. "This is problematic insofar as contemporary globalisation is seen as necessarily

emerging out of earlier developments as the only possible present, and the only conceivable future" (Holton, 1998: 9-10) - which it is not.

Virtual geography: dimensions of localism

Under globalisation, a new dynamic has also been set up between the movement of capital, images, and technologies, without regard to national borders or the tendency toward fragmentation of the world into increasingly contentious enclaves of difference, ethnicity, and resistance. Under new forms of cultural production, national identities of political allegiance and economic regulation are being undone. At the same time imagined communities are being reshaped at both the global and local levels of everyday existence. These perspectives have simultaneously made the world more globalised and localised than before; a new social order, which at the same time, has been constructed by an increasing interdependence and internationalisation of institutions as well as new universal forms of subjectivity.

If we stop for a moment and think about it, however, we could say that in this networked world, we have two distinct sets of experiences. The first is our experience of familiar places and activities; the places where we sleep, the places where we eat, the places where we work, and the places where we are in all the in between times. From these places we acquire what Wark calls a 'geography of experience' (1994: vii). And this has probably been the case since the dawn of time. The second equally familiar, but new, terrain is the one created by the electronic communications technology; the television, the telephone, and the Internet, to name a few, all of which create almost instantaneous global experiences for us.

These globalised and varied experiences Wark calls vectors (forces that act together from various angles to produce a direction) that change our understandings of the world even as we receive them. It is a term from geometry meaning a line of fixed length and direction but having no fixed position. He employs it to mean any trajectory along which bodies, information, or warheads can potentially pass. This technology could link almost any three such sites, and relay video and audio information of a certain quality along those points at a given speed and at a certain cost. Yet in each case the speed of transmission and its quality would be essentially the same. This is the sense in which any particular media technology can he thought of as a vector. Media vectors have fixed properties, like the length of a line in the geometric concept of vector. Yet that vector has no necessary position: it can link almost any points together. It used this vector field to narrate, even to create and the events of the day. Yet it does not in any sense compose an equivalent to a "public sphere." The sense of belonging and becoming articulated in the abstracted space of the vector isn't the same as the sense of belonging in a public meeting, a crowd, an assembly, a communion. Its novelty is radically distorted by reducing it to any such model.

As the vectors impinge on us, we are changed and so are they – the vectors interact with us, and one result is a change in our perceptions. Wark calls these changed perceptions, 'telesthesia' (1994: vii), a perception at a distance. It is a considerably different perception from that created when we experience things up close. Telesthesia is our 'virtual geography' (1994: vii), the experience that doubles, troubles, and generally permeates our experiences of our familiar local space. We are susceptible to these vectors because as Wark says 'we no longer have roots, we have aerials' (1994: x). In other words, these global vectors change our immediate world through changing the ways in which we see what we are familiar with –- the familiar has been made unfamiliar.

Telesthesia perception abstracted from the particulars of place, is a different thing from being

present at a site, together with a crowd of any kind. Traditional stories, rooted in place, are designed to persist through time, passed on from old to young, old to young. Vectoral stories, abstracted from place, are designed to transmit across space, from site to site to site. To successfully create an abstract belonging, ever more extensive vectors require ever more abstracted forms of story. As its reach, in expanse, increases, its credibility, in particulars, diminishes. Here is Lyotard's (1984) incredulity toward metanarratives; it grows slowly with the progressive abstraction of the vector. As the vector spreads its reach, the organizational form legitimating itself as the gatekeeper of stories becomes progressively more abstracted from everyday life, more specialized as a manager of media vectors alone. Most of metanarratives persist, but the organizations they legitimate become progressively more banal, using the vector to legitimise their power in turn to offer eternal salvation, social amelioration, temporary pleasure.

This form of power-policing and regulating territory, separation and controlling space, maintaining bodies in place in a grid might seem to have more to do with Foucault's panopticon than with Virilio's vector, and indeed it does. The relation between these two forms of power, which develop in a related fashion but along distinct temporalities, is a complex one. Foucault's model of the panopticon is a model of the disciplinary society. "Our society" he writes, is one of:

> surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies with depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies (Foucault, 1977: 217).

Yet there is another modality of power besides the abstract law of capital and the grid of discipline. The vector field is like capital in that it projects itself outwards, it tries to open space to the full potential for mobility of bodies, weapons, information, and commodities. It requires a technology of movement and a control of time that permits an instant response to any and every conjuncture. As such it is an overpower of the separations imposed upon urban space by discipline and capital. The binary division of labor and the minute classifications of discipline are both traversed and reunited, in their separation, by the motive power of the vector. Capital divides time in a binary opposition of work and leisure, while discipline unfolds its meticulous schedules. The vector is a form of power that does not mark off time in even portions but seizes the moment, rapidly and violently.

Thus we can add the vector to the list of the logics of the modern city. The logic of the law of capital; the disciplinary techniques of power; the tactics of everyday life; the extensive vector; negotiating the space between the city and its other. Not only is the identity of the individual fabricated and continued in a disciplinary apparatus of statements and visibilities, the identity of places is also fabricated and maintained in an apparatus of vectors. Virilio and Foucault can thus be seen as writing in singularly complementary ways about analogous disciplinary techniques, albeit ones with distinct histories. Deleuze comments that:

> Virilio believes he opposes Foucault when he claims that the problem of modem societies, the problem for the "police," is not one of confinement but

> concerns the "highways," speed or acceleration, the mastery and control of speed, circuits and grids set up in open space. But this is just what Foucault has said, as is proved by the analysis of the fortress carried out by both authors, or by Foucault's analysis of the naval hospital. This misunderstanding is not serious in Virilio's case, because the force and originality of his own work testifies to the fact that encounters between independent thinkers always occur in a blind zone (Deleuze, 1988: 42).

However, the world of virtual geography also acts independently of our local world. The horror of conflicts and wars, streaming into our living rooms every night, become disempowering as we experience its horror and our inability to either understand it or do anything about it. It is, at the same time, a spectacle; our world becomes a virtual theatre of cruelty. Both of these effects interact to give further experiences. These events, now global spectacles, would once have been isolated and under the jurisdiction of some expert local knowledges and politics. Nowadays, these events have escaped this type of jurisdiction and instead are displayed on screen like a movie. The media technology -- whether by design or accident -- display images that are juxtaposed with each other in ways in which was previously impossible, thereby creating new images and impressions. These new images alter our perceptions, enter the realm of politics and economics, and have real effects. These new spaces ‘glocalities’ –- spaces in which there is mutual interpenetration by both the global and the local and it is difficult to analyse which is which. And from now on, we may never again be able to separate them.

Although there have been many explanations for the conflicts and wars, no explanation is regarded as the definitive one. From this we can say that neither the media, nor ourselves in the local, can adequately explain the horror. One thing the media often focus on, however, is the plight of suffering children in the conflict zones. These images of children certainly promoted the media globally as they captured our imagination and our immediate ways in which we experience the world. The images may also, perhaps, have helped ‘us’ to cope with the horrors by keeping alive the belief that there was still the hope to be had through activity, in the midst of such incoherence. After all, as they say, ‘you have to do something!’ As a result, all around the world money is raised and children are moved to various care centres in parts of that world or televised at feeding stations (often covered in flies).

As well as having devastatingly real effects in the local site, these types of events are clearly media ones. Such an event could not have happened 100 years ago; it is the media that has created the stage upon which to display the altruism towards the children. It is also a stage on which the war itself may very well have been affected in the local. These types of events are very complex; we certainly do not understand them in any masterful way. The problem is that their theorisation does not belong exclusively to any current academic discipline because no thing in the events can be taken as an exclusive object of study; the complexity is too great. And neither does the theorisation belong to interdisciplinary studies, which still take for granted the traditional ‘field management’ and contents itself with wandering along its own imaginary boundaries. The virtual geography of this event, it seems, is unavailable for (inter)disciplinary study because it is outside the boundaries of the disciplines. As Wark suggests we are faced today, then, with the requirement for ‘a critical cultural intervention that is increasingly global in scope, and exceeds the boundaries of any particular national culture and hegemonic class order’ (1994: ix).

Some Consequences for the Philosophy of Education

If, globalization as a unifying force is invalidated, how is it that in a very short time, globalisation has become a popular context for referring to education. What, then, might hold if globalisation is education's new legitimating metaphor along with accounts of fragmentation and dislocation of subjectivity? What are the challenges posed, when on the one hand modernist economic forces for unity and homogeneity are promoted with little space for difference, and on the other hand, when postmodernism promotes differences. It might be that globalisation is yet another unachievable transcendent ideal that, paradoxically, actually produces dialectic and difference; the more intensive the forces of globalisation, the more intense is the surge of dialectic and difference.

Western state education systems have taken these ideas to heart, and are now directed at the total mobilisation of human capital in the interests of global financial capital. In the past dictatorships feared freedom of expression, censored political opposition, locked up writers and burned controversial books. In order to subjugate humanity, advertising, or any commodity, has kept a low profile, preferring flexibility and persuasion instead. For the first time we are living within a system of human domination against which even freedom is powerless. Indeed the system stakes all it has on liberty, and this is its masterstroke. Any criticism works to the system's own advantage, and anti-advertising diatribes only reinforce the illusion of its sweetly smiling tolerance. The system obtains one's submission with elegance. It has achieved its goal since disobedience itself has become a form of obedience. As a structurally reductionist force, advertising offers a compressed and oversimplified view of the world. It relies on stereotypes to dictate our desires. Worst of all, it forces us to accept our own enslavement: the 'dangers of social oppression are not the horrors done to me against my will - though they are bad enough - but the horrors I am made to desire' (Todd, 1991: 31).

The 'truths' of government are that we are free, that the free market is best for us. But liberal education, which could have provided a critique of such consumerist notions, may no longer he a choice for many within state-controlled education. When consumers purchase education, education becomes a contract between the buyer and the chooser, and, as we eve seen above, when education becomes a contractual purchase, comes non-political. Thus the changes to policies in ministries of government, and the devolution of issues to schools, have essentially involved the politicisation of education in the names of "choice" and "quality". Choice and quality after devolution are now negotiated at the contractual level between student (or parent) and provider. Choice on social issues at the no contractual level has been occluded and depoliticised in this relation. 'Schooling in postindustrial conditions seems to be heading in a different, disturbing direction: toward partial or de facto privatisation and toward models of market competition that risk exacerbating the problems of inequality' (Luke, 1998).

There is nothing in this sense about the resurgent energy of populism, dubiously manifested in xenophobic, bigoted, and sexist militias, but also in environmental justice initiatives, sustainability movements, and the array of protests at the meeting sites of the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. The globals, in essence, have no real conditions of existence. For the locals, though, globalization enforces an unbridgeable alienation of desire from a faded and dull resistant reality, and strips away all values but global values. This is what it means to define global society as a consumer society: the only aspiration possible is to be a consumer, and the gates to this condition are monitored by the immense apparatus of credit agencies, enforcing localization on those whose consumer undiscipline disqualifies them from entry into commodity paradise. These excluded locals - vagabonds, as opposed to tourists - are "dark vagrant moons reflecting the shine of bright tourist suns and following placidly the planets' orbit; the mutants of postmodern evolution, the monster rejects of the brave new

species" (92) Bauman. Those who rebel have no independent resources, no independent identity from their synoptical Others, and thus no means of signifying difference other than in the pure opposition, the pure negativity of the permanent criminal, whose incarceration is no longer even theoretically rehabilitative, but only segregating, a symbol to those outside of the need to fight crime, more and more often the dominant civic concern.

Education is now marketed under the marketing strategies of the neoliberal information-dispensing retail outlets (including their electronic versions) that rely on the accreditation of standardised products and systems as their rationale for quality. This account suggests that economic rationality has captured education and neoliberalism has simply commodified liberal education for its global market. These education systems are increasingly governed by globally influenced, nation-state control of standardised testing, managerialised curriculum and administration under neoliberal moral explanations for humanity. Such education systems combine total mobilisation with maximum economic productivity, as the ultimate source of economic rationalist value. As such they are more reminiscent of an economy at war than an education focussed on survival, health, and vitality. Economic value takes precedence and is marketed directly to individuals who are also redefined under a form of subjectivity that makes its appeal to individual autonomy in the market. But, in its unaware state as Marshall (1996) points out, this autonomy is more apparent than real; it merely reacts to the limits and features of the market. That market can be changed infinitely as required within the limits of financial capital's influence over governments.

This neglect of the historicity and political character of present change is rooted in an even more fundamental failure to grasp the past historical roots of globalists. The meaning of global culture does not depend on the symbolic dross of contemporary commerce - Coca Cola and MacDonalds. It is rooted, rather, in the fundamental common experiences - of world wars, holocausts, the defeat of fascism. However much these seem to belong, or are even appropriated by, particular national communities, they are actually common possessions of humankind and core experiences of our common, global humanity at the turn of the twenty-first century.

This 'reformed' educational environment demands the constitution of enterprising individuals in order to intensify competition in the newly constructed markets. If that enterprising subject is employed in the continuous development of itself, its value will be assessed by its enterprising capacity. The only thing of value is in the consumption of the commodity (i.e., information), since the electronic system is not configured by virtue of its economic rationality to recognise any other activity. Under this rationality, there are no internal spaces within which to critique the values and concepts that are integral to the system of electronic consumption. And, as long as the consumption continues, so also will the production of information whose chief value is the exchange. The problem with such notions of rationality is that they are directed at the suppression of the liberal individual and the constitution of a neoliberal subject as the efficient tool of what calls late capitalism (Mandel, 1978: 118). On this basis, we might want to revalue the present arrangements of education, including its moral ideals.

Economics has become a global discourse to which all developments under globalistion must adhere; it effectively silences all other voices. 'They present a version of culture change that attempts to secure the consent of teachers and integrate it with otherwise unchanged managerial practices' (Peters, et.al. 2000: 127). Under this rubric of economic rationalism, there are no spaces for questions about the value of liberal values. Information in the market

has replaced education as the primary allocative mechanism of the distribution of rationality. What matters now is increasing the levels of rationality so that information exchange is maximally effective. Since rationality is said to depend on information, we are thus in the iron grip of rationality. This type of education is not a creative venture, since rationality is the solution always -- and already -- supplied. Since the solution is already available, there is nothing of value to create. Therefore, insofar as creation is associated with life, there is no 'life' in the system; it is nihilistic in that it is based on 'faith' in the transcendent principle of reason manifested in personal autonomy derived from the economic metaphors of efficiency, growth, national security, standardisation. With economic rationalism as the guiding explanation for education, with reason as the ultimate value in liberal education, with homoeconomicus as the fundamental explanation for human functioning, with the market as the primary allocative device in society, and with economics explained through high status disciplines such as science and mathematics, the circle is closing.

Such issues raise pressing questions for educational philosophy about the evaluation of values. It may be difficult to establish evaluations of worth from within the globalised education system because evaluations are the "modes of existence of those who judge and evaluate, serving as principles for the values on the basis of which they judge" (Deleuze, 1983: 1). The values, then, are the symptoms of the principles. Since we select the evaluators from within the social system, any evaluation merely exposes the tables of values already embedded. This process cannot provide a revaluing of the worth of those values. For revaluation, the values themselves must be critiqued: that critique exposes their worth. A critique of globalisation must be an important object of revaluation for the philosophy of education.

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economic		cultural
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Figure 1: Axes of globalisation		