

The question concerning creativity

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Abstract

At the UNESCO World Conference on Arts Education - Building Creative Capacities for the 21st Century, held in Lisbon 6-9 March 2006, delegates were reminded that “humans all have creative potential” and that to the current drivers of education - “literacy” and “numeracy” - creativity should be added. But what is creativity and how does it do what it does? Is creativity an intuition, a disposition, or simply the result of good tuition? What is its place in education, in the knowledge-economy, in our individual lives? For this writer, the question of creativity is inextricably linked to an ontology of being as the history of philosophy frequently shows. This paper questions notions of ‘being creative’ on the way to opening up our relationship to the essence of creativity, taking Heidegger’s (1977) interpretation of essence as “the way something pursues its course” (p. 2).

Introduction

We are all, we are told, ‘God’s creatures’—‘creature’ being that which is created. Gods create creatures, they create worlds, and many other phenomena besides—but what of the creative human being? In art, Heidegger (2001) asks whether the artist creates the work or does the work create the artist. We can also ask whether ‘being-creative’ is an attribute or a behaviour. Is creativity a conscious or sub-conscious act? Can we be trained to be creative or is it something innate or inherited, perhaps even a gift? How do creating and making differ? In schooling and commerce we must ask whether creativity is intended as a form of problem-solving or a bringing forth of ideas?

When writing *The Arts in the New Zealand Curriculum* document (2000) the writers became aware of teacher nervousness surrounding the term “create”, with many teachers believing it to mean the development of something entirely new in the world, and many of them also did not see themselves as creative persons. As a result terms such as “explore”, “invent” and “developing ideas” were used in the curriculum document in place of “create” to soften the implications associated with the word.

Being creative can be a desirable strength or it can be seen as a distinct weakness and ‘creative solutions’ often amount to little more than ways around a problem and a form of shortcutting. Creative accounting, for example, implies illegality in order to beat the system. Saying someone teaches creatively might be intended as positive feedback, but can also be taken as lack of planning, improvising on the spot – faking it. For example, one primary school principal related to me that she had been instructed by her Board to review the school Charter. Where three years earlier the charter had sought to promote “creative quality teaching”; in review this simply became “quality teaching” (“creative” possibly being construed as meaning ‘inconsistent’) as the school sought to define its performativity.

Create stems from the Latin *creat-* meaning to make, to produce, to bring forth. Its English meanings are varied and include bringing something into existence; to give rise to or produce; to make something happen; and, to use one’s imagination to invent things or to produce works of art, create a poem, music, or a business model.

The literature surrounding creativity often examines the creative process and Wallas’s (1926) model of *preparation, incubation, illumination, verification* still rings true for many engaged in creative acts. At a glance the model suggests a subconscious process, but giving consideration to preparation and verification suggests that more reflective and analytical methods are implied, linking the creative and analytical in interactive and complimentary ways. Subsequent models all show a similar liaison between analytical and creative thinking.

Schooling places considerable responsibility on its role to teach its students to come to know and master the symbols of their culture, or at least of the dominant culture in which the schooling occurs. In engaging with the problem of creativity, psychologist Csikszentmihalyi (1996) suggests that creativity “is a process by which a symbolic domain in the culture is changed” adding that “it takes effort to change tradition” (p. 8). Arts philosopher Eisner (2002) claims that many of the most complex and subtle forms of thinking take place when students have “an opportunity either to work meaningfully on the creation of images—whether visual, choreographic, musical, literary, or poetic—or to scrutinise them appreciatively. To be able to create a form of experience that can be regarded as aesthetic requires a mind that animates our imaginative capacities and that promotes our ability to undergo emotionally pervaded experience” (p. xii). Gardner (1982) does not believe the combination of native talent, appropriate pedagogy and developed skills are enough to yield the creative person; “the competent craftsman, yes—the innovative master, no” (p. 90). Poet Stephen Spender (in Ghiselin, 1952) says that “the problem of creative writing is essentially one of concentration”, a concentration that “for the purpose of writing poetry, is different from the kind of concentration required for working out a sum. It is a focussing of the attention... so that the poet is aware of all the implications and possible developments of (their) idea” (p. 113).

Critical literacy theorist Paulo Freire (1990) believes the educator’s efforts must coincide with those of the students to engage in critical thinking and a quest for mutual humanisation. He claims the educator’s “efforts must be imbued with a profound trust in men and their creative power” (p. 49). Creative power for Freire is the transforming of consciousness and a setting free. Traditional forms of schooling that see the teacher as the master of knowledge and the students as mere objects of reception he refers to as the banking concept of education—the teacher deposits knowledge into the students’ heads. The banking concept transforms students into receiving objects and, for Freire (ibid), “inhibits their creative power” (p. 51).

Bröckling (2006) suggests that the “imperative of being creative is nowadays connected to the mobilisation of the entrepreneurial self. Entrepreneurial action demands permanent innovation—and consequently ceaseless creative exertion. Everybody not only has to be creative, but more creative than the others” (p. 513). He writes that, “in the political economy, creativity is an economical resource that the market both mobilises and consumes” (ibid, p. 516); the entrepreneur has to keep creative innovation happening to keep their market appeal, to be more creative than others in a constant cycle of creative performativity.

In coming to terms with a global setting for everyday educational practices, we might reflect on Lyotard’s (1979/1984) proposition that the status of knowledge changes as societies become ‘postindustrial’ and cultures become ‘postmodern’. As a result, institutional activities become legitimised through the principle of *performativity*, the optimising of the overall performance of social institutions, such as schools, according to the criterion of efficiency in relation to economic benefits. However, performance now defines a human’s worth as education becomes more technologised and educational evaluations merely performance-based ideologised notions of what constitutes intelligent and creative performance.

The global marketplace appears to do only one thing and that is to put a price on everything. The role of culture and creativity should go beyond economics and should not focus on the price of things, but on the value of the artistic and creative practice, valuing the production more than the product. For example, the essence of the arts is not about entertainment but the human experience and development of mind and body—the embodied experience. The craftsperson is not necessarily the same as the creative person and we might have a well crafted piece of pop music for entertainment purposes, but the creative artist produces music that enhances human consciousness. What might this mean for how we now define creativity within the global knowledge-economy is the focus of this paper.

The Question Concerning Creativity

In questioning creativity I seek to prepare a free relationship to it. The “relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence” of creativity (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 3). A work of creative

endeavour is not the same as the essence of creativity for, while the essence is in all creative works, the creative work itself is not to be encountered in all other creative works.

We are in danger of being defined by creativity in the way that Heidegger (1962/1977) claims we are “chained to technology” (p. 4). The esteem with which we perceive the creative obscures us to its essence and to what the creative thing is, what it does, and what it represents. Despite this, the term creative takes on a range of meanings and implications and we hear of creative children and animals, creative business practices, and the term permeates discussions of the arts and the poetic. In mundane terms, the group of songwriters that regularly turned up for work at the Brill Building in the 1960s (e.g., Carole King, Neil Sedaka, Neil Diamond, Bobby Darin) were expected to sit in their small individual offices and ‘create’ pop songs. The conception of creativity as a human activity can also be defined as instrumental—a means with performative ends. This implies that creative may not even refer to anything tangible like a creative work of art, it might refer to an idea, a solution, or even a deviant act.

The instrumental conception of creativity as it is currently understood attempts to bring those in the knowledge-society into the right relation to it. Creativity is a Thing to be accessed, something ready-to-hand, constantly there as a reserve and awaiting a powerful moment to spring into action. This bringing-forth out of concealment into a presencing is *poiêsis* or even *physis – poiêsis* in its highest sense. Our creative tendency bursts open, bringing forth not only itself, but the artist/craftsperson, businessman, politician, soldier, musician, teacher, criminal, whosoever the mode of occasioning reveals. Creativity has come to mean *alêtheia*, the revealing of a truth, but I am about to suggest that the commodification of creativity throughout the centuries has reached its highest form of harnessing in the condition of the knowledge-economy. By referring to the knowledge-economy in this way I mean to imply that I see the condition of knowledge as a project of the global economy. The creative revealing can no longer be merely present, for human imagination and expression must be turned into reward, but not the reward of personal satisfaction or even recognition, rather the reward of ownership, accumulation, and distribution culminating in financial gain in contexts where ‘truth’ becomes a minor consideration.

Like the dams on the Rhine that Heidegger refers to, the global economy regulates the creative flow, challenging revealing through its regulating and securing. Creativity is everywhere ordered to stand by, to be at-hand and awaiting further ordering. As a standing-reserve creativity loses its autonomy, “for it has standing only from the ordering of the orderable” (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 17). Creative ideas are now a mere utterance in the ebb and flow of the global markets; “for *idea* names not only the nonsensuous aspect of what is physically visible. Aspect (*idea*) names and is, also, that which constitutes the essence in the audible, the tasteable, the tactile, in everything that is in any way accessible” (ibid, p. 20).

Man has been using creative ideas for millennia, with creative thinking responding to what addressed the thinker. Creativity often challenges laws, defies common-sense, but while creative success has always been rewarded, in the knowledge-economy it becomes a form of long-term investment. This condition that orders us into a creative revealing as a standing-reserve Heidegger refers to as *Ge-stell* – Enframing. Enframing calls forth, it assembles and orders, and “puts into a framework or configuration everything it summons forth, through an ordering for use that it is forever restructuring anew” (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 19). *Gestell* (frame) may be used to name the essence of contemporary creativity in the knowledge-economy, but in considering *stellen* as meaning to “set upon” *Ge-stell* can come to mean Enframing.

In the knowledge-economy we are “challenged forth into revealing” (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 21). This revealing concerns cultural markets and web-based transmissions as the storehouse of the standing-reserve of creativity. The Internet is the herald of Enframing, it brings to presence, holding sway, yet concealing the essence of creativity. The causality of the creative act, whether material, form, function or affect, is diminished in relation to its marketable potential. Creativity becomes a standing-reserve only in relation to the global marketplace. The knowledge-economy seeks to bring creativity under control as a resource classified as contributing to the massive web-based pool of creative ideas. The cyber-world is seen as little more than an object packed with imaginative utterances to be turned into earthly rewards.

The essence of such creativity lies in Enframing which pursues and promotes nothing other than what is revealed in ordering according to the global marketplace. Within the mode of Enframing, it becomes the role of the marketplace to define the destiny and purposes of creativity, ordered up from the pool of standing-reserves. The danger in this is that it drives out other possibilities for creativity and in the knowledge-economy it is ordered to merely stand-by and await further ordering, but such ordering is forever restructuring anew. Enframing conceals and holds sway while *poiêsis* unconceals and brings forth into the clearing. We need to ask whether the essence of creativity suggests the permanence of an Idea, and at what point does this Idea become tradition, revolution or simply product.

In asking what is the essence of creativity, I am not seeking a definition such as a 'means and human imagination', for creativity extends beyond our base desires. Is the essence of creativity nothing creative? Has the Enframing of creativity within the knowledge-economy left behind its associations with the poetic, with *poiêsis*, with *technê*? Has the will to be creative, to master the techniques of creative thinking, meant that creativity threatens to slip from our control? Has creativity come to mean the mundane and miscellaneous, rather than the channelling and challenging of possibilities? Do men and women use creativity on their way to being, or does creativity use them as a stage of revealing? Is creativity in fact one understanding of our being? If we understand an action as being creative, then we have stepped outside our creative understanding of our being. This creative understanding of our being should be central to the present time where the dogma of the marketplace promotes being in fundamentalist ways.

The essence of freedom governs the clearing and the lighting up that creativity might bring is the happening of revealing. The creative person must be free and not constrained by the regulation of the global market which places an ambiguity of revealing on the creative; our human resources are a very different concept to that of humans as a resource. The essence of creativity has to be confronted; creating for a market is not the same as creating as a way of bringing forth and revealing, creativity can "not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are *questioning* (Heidegger, 1962/1977, p. 35).

Dasein (there *being* or *being there*) is Heidegger's way of referring both to the human being and to the type of Being that humans have, and Dasein cannot be what it wants to be. Dasein is in the world in the sense that it occupies a place together with other things, but it continually interprets and engages us with other entities and the context in which they lie - the environment or the world around us. For Heidegger (1927/1962), "being is always the being of an entity" (p. 26), such as Being-creative, and he assigns the term Dasein to the entity so that we might conceive Being creative as meaning to be creative. But it is Dasein which stands for any person who has being, and is thus an 'entity' in him/herself. Claiming truth to be unconcealment or uncovering, Heidegger sees Dasein as the primary locus of truth: "*there is truth only in so far as Dasein is and as long as Dasein is*" (ibid, p. 269).

Dasein, as everyday being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others, for being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely. The inconspicuous domination by others that has been taken over unawares from Dasein is a form of discourse. The environment that is closest to us, the public environment, is already ready-to-hand and is a matter of concern. How might we view the effect of that public environment known as the World Wide Web, which is a key distribution tool for the knowledge-economy, and what effect does this have on the creative individual? Our creative turns and ways of being disposed to the world are inevitably affected, for the public way in which our creativity has been interpreted has already been decisive for what possibilities are offered for our being-creative. Being-with-one-another "concerns itself as such with averageness, which is an essential characteristic of the 'they' This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the 'levelling down' of all possibilities of being" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pp. 164-165).

As the term "creativity" falls into everyday use and bookshelves are filled with unlocking creativity-type publications, the notion of creativity becomes commonplace. This might be beneficial for the 'knowledge-wave' but it dilutes the concept of creative actions as something to be taken seriously; creativity is not just a quick solution in the interest of profit and efficiency. This everydayness becomes a totalizing practice of

creativity ready-at-hand resulting in a levelling of our understanding of being, for it becomes an ontological condition that transforms our understanding of being.

Heidegger and Being

Heidegger's view of Being is best understood as the ways in which everyday practices permeate our lives in particular ways. These practices show up as something which provides a background to what counts as a human being and what it makes sense to do. We can then direct our actions towards particular things or people, showing up what can be done, for example, in order to be heroic or literate. This understanding creates what Heidegger calls a 'clearing' (*Lichtung*) which can both limit and open up what can and cannot be done through its 'unobtrusive governance'. We can relate this to discourse practices which generate subjectivity. Heidegger was aware of this danger and his 'unobtrusive governance' closely resembles later post-structuralist theories of 'power-knowledge'.

How Being is to be looked at and its meaning understood and conceptually grasped means choosing the right entity or class of entities for our inquiry and determining a genuine way of access to it. Claiming that inquiring is one of the possibilities of Being (through an entity), Heidegger assigns the term 'Dasein' to the entity. Dasein can be translated as meaning 'there-being' or 'Being-there'. "Being is always the Being of an entity" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 26) and we might conceive 'Being creative' as meaning "to be creative", but it is Dasein which stands for any *person* who has Being, and "is thus an 'entity' in him/herself" (ibid, footnote 1, p. 27).

Dasein unifies the world, rather than leaving it a fragmentary collection of entities. From its central position, Dasein draws together its threads and brings the whole world along with it. Dasein is not an actual thing, but the possibility of various ways of being; it does not so much reflect whether 'to be or not to be', but *how* to be, for circumstances restrict Dasein on what it can do. Dasein's potentiality or possibility is prior to its actuality; it is not a definite actual thing but the possibility of various ways of being, possibilities rather than tangibilities. It interprets and engages with other entities forming a unitary world rather than a dislocated collection of entities. The educational notion of Being creative should motivate us to look for possibilities, not telling *that* you must be creative, but asking *how* might you be creative.

The nature of entities in their Being can be determined without necessarily having the explicit concept of the meaning of Being at one's disposal. The process reflects the average understanding of Being and "*which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself*" (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 28). The basic structures of an entity – such as Nature, written language, a (creative) piece of music – can be worked out in pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain of Being in which the subject-matter is confined. Meanwhile, "scientific research accomplishes roughly and naïvely the demarcation and initial fixing of the areas of subject-matter" (p. 29).

Entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained. But Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood. (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 228)

As a verb, dasein means 'to exist' or 'to be there or here', while as a noun Dasein is used by philosophers, such as Kant, for the existence of any entity. Heidegger seems to restrict his use of Dasein to human beings – 'being there' or 'being here'. The term 'being there' neither takes the place of the term 'consciousness' nor does the 'object' designated as "being there" take the place of what we think when we speak of 'consciousness'. 'Being there' names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place, namely, the location of the truth of being (Heidegger, 1972). Dasein as 'there-being' has a space-time continuum, pre-existing any being which may come to inhabit it. When translated as being-there it implies that 'being' pre-exists 'there', and is clearly not the best interpretation, so there-being is more

appropriate. In referring to there-being, rather than just 'being', Heidegger implies a more thorough connectedness to the world that unfolds over time.

The global economy

Globalisation has blurred the boundaries between public and private and established a binary between the Self and Other. The knowledge-economy is one dimension of globalization that particularly impacts on education and while the intellect of the creative individual is personal, in the knowledge-economy it quickly becomes categorized as 'property'. This means that when we refer to "intellectual property" there is an inherent tension between 'intellect' and 'property', between the creative self and what quickly becomes property owned by others.

If we see globalisation as a rapidly developing network of interconnections and interdependencies that characterise contemporary social life, culturally we can sense an oppositional dynamic between local identity and enterprise and global ambition. The time-space compression enhanced by global technologies has resulted in social and cultural practices being less local and independent as they become just another dimension of globalization. Local lifestyles have become globally consequential and the *New Zealand Curriculum: Draft for Consultation 2006* document demonstrates this through its stated dual aims of meeting local needs while teaching towards the knowledge-economy, implying that the local is about to become couched in a global framework.

The development of a knowledge-economy, as an aspect of the commerce-economy, positions it to contribute to human enculturation, a collective process whereby we 'liberate' ourselves from our base and naturally-given needs and desires into more meaningful values that will service the needs and desires of the global state. This individualising of education does not appear to favour students seeking their personal creative potential in the world, but rather to ensure that global markets are sustained in the coming decades. Modern economic developments seem to sideline communities and even nation states as they press 'educated' and atomised individuals into service. Such a concept sees education as a business product that can be exported for high value return and as an outcome of computer networking and connectivity, information and knowledge intensification, and globalisation.

The notion of a knowledge-based economy has some history in New Zealand and in a 1999 submission to the New Zealand Government by the Minister for Information Technology's IT Advisory Group (supported by the international professional services organisation - Ernst & Young) the government was urged to "take the next important step and transform New Zealand from a pastoral economy into a knowledge-driven economy". This aligns with the strategies promoted by the OECD who in 2006 published a new document in their 'Schooling for Tomorrow' series called *Think Scenarios, Rethink Education* (2006) which proposes new pedagogical strategies for education. The terms "strategies" and "scenarios" come through as key aspects of a document that urges educators to move from the 'industrial' and 'agricultural ages' that formed education, into the 'Information Age' which will need practitioner-based systems thinkers. Despite evidence to the contrary, such as a rise in dairy produce returns for New Zealand farmers, the Government seems obsessed with knowledge and information as export products and this could potentially make agriculture a redundant factor in New Zealand financial circles. An increasing number of 'stakeholders' now make demands on education, including the OECD, who seek to shape the markets of the future through education. This is reflected in the OECD document (2006) which begins by criticising the short-term thinking that straitjackets education and which promotes the need to think long-term in order to meet the challenges of complexity and change.

For the OECD (2006), the function of schooling is no longer just about delivery or supply. It claims that we need to shift our values and gear education from its socially oriented perspectives to where it is individualistically oriented in an educational system that is geared to its "clients" both as consumers and as knowledge-producers (pp. 12-13). Global capitalism has to produce spaces for its market and these spaces not only have a profound effect on consumerism and world economies, but on how education is conceived

and maintained. The capitalist policy of endless accumulation requires human resources to be made ready for all levels of the labour force.

The pathway to an improved and assured economic future for New Zealand is frequently exemplified by the public airing of the successful digital simulations (in medicine, flight, design, etc) created for the global market by local computer graphic design specialists. The limitations of the economic rationale in schooling become apparent when one considers the changes being made to the New Zealand curriculum. The *New Zealand Curriculum: Draft for Consultation 2006* places a series of key competencies ahead of specific subject knowledge (implying the tired argument against the silo-isation of knowledge), and promoting interconnectivity as a way of improving performativity. If human knowledge is to be further diluted then knowledge itself, like the digital simulacra so prized by the government ministers, could become a mere simulation, digitised for effect and representing only the new tradition of the biopolitical. This puts a new perspective on educational views of students as individuals, for under this model individual human potential is likely to be subsumed under the commercial desire for individuals to be part of a pool of human resources, or “standing-reserves”.

Creative and cultural ownership becomes a matter of interest for corporate imperialism and the distribution of creative and cultural products is the site of production of exchange value and profit. Distribution is the ground that underpins cultural, political and corporate power. Cubitt (2005) believes that the power of governments and transnational corporations depends on their ability to direct or delay the flow of mediation - mediation here meaning the physical, dimensional and informational aspects of the world. Distribution, production and audiencing rely on economies, marketing techniques and technologies within space and time. Distribution is also reliant on a compliant global population, whose members prefer consumption to production. Distribution is becoming increasingly alienated from the creative moments of production and audiencing and so has positioned itself as the critical moment in the control of regimes of power and communication.

The music industry is one of the most notorious for protecting its hold on distribution in the global market. It lays claims that its interests are really those of giving the artists, as creators, their full due, but full due does not really describe the so-called benefits of copyright protection for the artist and payouts are often as low as 6 percent of the industry ‘take’. Copyright protection has become an industry in itself. Despite cries of copyright theft and the criminalising of hapless teenagers caught downloading their favourite songs, the US copyright industries have seen their profits grow from \$178.8 billion in 1977, to \$791.2 billion in 2001 (Cubitt, 2005, p. 199). In the global economy, schools are required to pay copyright fees for playing music in their classrooms, performing songs at choral festivals, and any teacher who attempts to hand out notated versions of music for analysis to their class without first committing to the payment of a copyright fee is liable to incur legal action. Equally controlling is the fact that while distribution networks are responsible for the spread of cultural products, they can also control what products they distribute. Cubitt notes that “both promoting and denying circulation confer wealth and power, introducing disjunctures, deferrals, omissions and selections that restructure and reorganise both content and audience activity” (p. 200).

Copyright earnings for the United States in 1990 amounted to 20 percent of GDP, and are now believed to be as high as 30 percent of GDP. To ensure this cash flow is not interrupted, the World Trade Organisation requires its member states to subscribe to copyright and intellectual property regulations similar to those of the United States, for example, the lifetime of the creator plus seventy years (still fifty years in some countries). This is by no means fixed as demonstrated in the following example of Mildred and Patty Hill who co-wrote the classroom greeting song *Good Morning to All* in 1893. In 1924 the lyrics were altered to become “Happy Birthday to You” and it became the song we sing at birthday parties on a global scale. Mildred, it should be noted, had died in 1916. In 1988, Birch Tree Group Ltd, sold the rights of *Happy Birthday to You* to Warner Communications for an estimated \$25 million. The song will not enter public domain until the expiration of the copyright in 2030 (114 years after Mildred’s death). Warner Communications currently charge the public high fees for the right to perform the song. Everyone still sings

it at birthday parties, but they are liable if a copyright protection agency finds out. Tradition and culture have become something to be owned.

Licence fees for educational institutions have now become a significant expenditure, with more being added all the time, limiting student interactions with the creative arts. The Australasian Performing Right Association (APRA) is currently being challenged by the Australian Federal Government, who now believes APRA see education as a 'cash cow' and want to know what the money is for and who it goes to. In New Zealand, the Ministry of Education keeps no record of what schools spend on licensing rights and cannot even offer a ballpark figure.

The control that corporate record companies exercise over musicians also constrains creative possibilities when composers and performers are instructed to modify their work to fit notions of suitability for commercial airplay. The rationale is the record companies' assumptions as to what their customers are intellectually capable of. In the pop music industry optimal production is required of its musicians and the companies exert a regulatory control on them in order to harness their creative potential.

As creativity acquires a certain validity in education workplace tools are inevitably 'invented' to simulate creative acts or to unlock creative impulses in relation to performativity. This technologising of a powerful human form of expression and problem-solving potentially downgrades the worth of creativity. The creative thinker becomes a mere component in an assembly-line of processes that feed the knowledge-economy. Creative thinkers may thus form part of an emerging cyber working class, their labour creating ideas, seen as links in the chain from the technologised individual to the global centres of accumulation and distribution.

For Lefebvre (1991) the production of space has become an end in itself and, as such, whosoever controls the space controls the markets of production *and* consumption. Power resides in the spaces of distribution and in the knowledge-economy knowledge-power has become what Foucault (1990) calls "an agent of transformation of human life" (p. 143). Our biological existence has for some time been reflected in our political existence and in the present age creativity passes into "knowledge's field of control and power's sphere of intervention" (ibid, p. 142) or biopower. Our biological life is now not irrelevant to politics; it has become its subject. *Bios* as a way of human living is now categorised *bios politicos*, while *zoê* as nutrition, reproduction and pleasure is discarded as a unique way of being.

Creativity and Biopolitics

The biopolitical dimensions of the politics of schooling and the economisation of education—knowledge-economy, the capitalisation of learners, performance-based research funding in tertiary education, and so on — clearly affect the administration of education and the autonomy of programmes and borders on the entrepreneurial. The production of a biopolitical body is a key activity not only of education in response to the demands of the nation state, but also to the sovereign capitalist powers whose global networks drive the knowledge-economy. The World Wide Web can be seen as part of a natural transition from the city state to global state. The deception lies in the appearances of individual autonomy, such as that which pre-dated the emergence of the city state, when in fact autonomy is a metaphor for a response to the stimulus created by the knowledge-economy.

While, according to Aristotle, humans appear to be more political than bees, our forms of communication permit activities of complex social and moral complexity, and this might be regarded as swarm intelligence. Swarm theory (Miller, 2007) examines how the simple actions of individuals add up to the complex behaviour of the group. The honey bee and the ant may not see the big picture, but they get the job done and insect colonies have been likened to an organism, behaving as a unitary whole (Kelly, 1994). The World Wide Web sets up conditions conducive to swarm intelligence, the collective abilities contributing to the success of the knowledge-economy, seemingly without a command from higher up the chain, for the network system seems to be self-organising. Such collective decision-making appears to bestow power on those at each stage of the process, but the power really resides with those at the upper end of the chain for they stand to gain most from the collective actions of others. The knowledge-economy, acting like an invisible hand through its web-based networks, seeks to unify and control like some voracious global organism of

production and consumption. Web users may feel they are equal socially, but are they likely to be socially equal?

Biopolitics regulates populations through biopower and is preoccupied with optimising life chances, for example through surveys for the prevention of epidemics and scarcity or its positions on emerging technologies. It governs through the regulative mechanisms that are able to account for 'unpredictable' phenomena occurring on a global scale, by determining an equilibrium and keeping events within an acceptable average. Biopolitics is present in the re-appropriation of culture into spaces where writing poetry can be likened to the natural acts such as the spinning of the silkworm, where works of art and architecture are constructed with the same ease and intuition as birds build their nests or spiders spin their webs, and where music flows as naturally as the calls of the whale and cicada or the songs of birds (Bull, 2007). The creative act loses its power of deliberate action and becomes a natural human function and the creative producer becomes alienated from the final object(s) of production. Biopower is not just discipline but regulation on a global scale.

At what point does the active member of a web-based knowledge-economy become alienated from civil society and from the *bios*? The World Wide Web poses as a public realm but is distanced from it simply by the nature of its deviant behaviours such as surveillance, marketing, misinformation and propaganda, viruses, promises of the good life, and so on. The Internet allows us to believe we can change the world without leaving our chairs, it dilutes our democratic participation and erodes our embodied and emotional engagement with the world and this inevitably impacts on our creative potential. I also suggest that the web user can be viewed and observed in the same way that zoo animals are, and in fact many web users deliberately set themselves up for observation becoming zoo-like creatures in spaces such as myspace.com seemingly influenced by the fictions of reality TV. It has been suggested that global warming will change the look of geographical spaces and perceptions of time, leaving the 'tourist' no option but to view the world through instantly available digitised images from their home. The web potentially feeds the voyeuristic hunger from within its technological cage and the human eye is in danger of becoming the technologised eye.

Conclusion

The contention of this paper has been that the ontology of being has been disrupted by moves to control natural human actions and responses, including creativity, by governments and global corporations. The dramatization and commodification of global climate change, genetic modification, consumption and even our diet suggest that natural history is about to be re-written. The scientific investigation of nature in the nineteenth century acted as a prelude to the biopolitical influences of the present. In the more spiritual past creation was a trialectic between God (what might be), the self (*Sein/being*) and the subject-object (the nothingness before creation). Gods and mythologies have now been replaced in the current politico-economic order by what Lütticken (2007) calls "a new unnatural history that ravages the planet, and created technologies that alter the substance of humanity itself" (p. 125). This is in the name of improving humanity, managing the human *bios*, and transforming human nature into something else.

The boundaries between the human as a living being and the human as a political subject have become blurred, and we must now ask "What does it mean to be a living-being?" Being-in-the-world requires self-determination and not a mass behavioural response. Because the creative act is associated with human acts, what does this mean for the realms of creativity? Freire's (1990) thesis of humans as transforming and creative beings who "in their permanent relations with reality, produce not only material goods – tangible objects – but also social institutions, ideas and concepts" (p. 73) is in danger of submitting to biopower. For Freire, animals cannot create products detached from themselves, and that it is reflection and action, as praxis, that enables humans to transform their reality. Framing creation within the biopolitical suggests that humans are now under the impression that the products they create are intimately related and attached to themselves and their needs, for the subjects of biopolitical power act not only on others but on themselves.

Globalisation infers a homogenous global society, free from oppression, and the World Wide Web appears as a key instrument of freedom. This leaves power, as biopower, free to act upon subjects simply because they perceive themselves to be free. The knowledge-economy implies that all knowledge has a price and that all knowledge is equal. Creativity, as a tool of the knowledge-economy, becomes less an instrument of human transformation and more a subjectivisation within institutional and international relations within the frame of biopower. Power is now less a relationship with identity than with creativity and innovation. We see emerging an oscillation between inclusion and exclusion, for those with the creative and innovative will can be taken into the fold, and those not fitting the category of modern globalised humans, with the particulars of the universal human, will enter what Agamben (1998) calls the 'zone of indistinction'.

Heidegger sought to show us that, as Being-in-the-world, Dasein is Selfhood because it transcends beings as a whole *toward* the world. This transcendence helps us to understand intentionality not only of subject and object but on the basis of understanding the mode of being intended which constitutes the ontological conditions of its possibility. Mental states are not some computational phenomenon, and cognition cannot take place without sensation and emotion to activate our consciousness. As Being-in-the-world Dasein, in concern, comports itself towards the entity rather than being alongside it. In contrast to the biopolitical state of being, this Being towards the world of its concern also reflects an authentic Being towards itself. This can be understood as the potential for Being that the creative self can bring about and the creative modes for Being-in-the-world. Creativity is thus not like a piece of equipment, a handy thing to have, for its essence should open out the possibilities for its presence in the world. This means that schooling should consider placing more emphasis on valuing the expressive forms and modes that enable humans to make sense of and structure their experiences in the world, rather than the world of education regulating and applying, through government, a political and economic power on all aspects of creative human life.

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